The effect of conference calls on analysts' forecasts:German evidence by Bassemir, Moritz et al.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691183
The Effect of Conference Calls on Analysts’ Forecasts
- German Evidence
Moritz Bassemir, Zoltan Novotny-Farkas, Julian Pachta∗
This Draft: November 2011
European Accounting Review, forthcoming
∗Dipl.-Kfm. Moritz Bassemir, Mag. Zoltan Novotny-Farkas, Dipl.-Kfm. Julian Pachta, Chair of Accoun-
ting and Auditing, Prof. Dr. Gu¨nther Gebhardt, Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main. Address: Gru¨ne-
burgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt/Main. Corresponding E-Mail: mbassemir@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de. We
thank Salvador Carmona (the editor), Felix Fischer, Gu¨nther Gebhardt, Martin Glaum (discussant at
the VHB Annual Conference 2010), Monika Hommel, Michael Raab, Michael Scholz, Joao Toniato,
two anonymous referees, workshop participants at the EAA Annual Congress 2010, the VHB Annual
Conference 2010, and two anonymous reviewers for the VHB Annual Conference 2010 for their valuable
comments. Moritz Bassemir is grateful to the Schmalenbach Gesellschaft fu¨r Betriebswirtschaft for
providing financial support to travel to the EAA Annual Congress 2010. Zoltan Novotny-Farkas grate-
fully acknowledges the financial contribution of the European Commission Research Training Network
INTACCT (Contract MRTN-CT-2006-035850). Part of the data was collected during a research visit
to the INTACCT partner institution Lancaster University.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691183
Abstract
This study examines whether conference calls provide additional information
to analysts. For a large sample of conference calls, hosted by German firms
between 2004 and 2007, our results show that conference calls improve analysts’
ability to forecast future earnings accurately. This suggests that additional
information is released during conference calls. The reduction in forecast error
is economically significant and larger in magnitude when compared to results
for the US (Bowen et al., 2002). These findings are consistent with the notion
that committing to additional disclosures is likely to yield greater effects in a
less stringent disclosure system (Verrecchia, 2001). Since the majority of our
sample firms conduct conference calls as closed calls, the evidence of this paper
suggests that conference calls may contribute to an information gap between
call participants and non-invited parties. Our findings should be of substantial
interest to European regulators seeking to level the informational playing field
for all investors.
JEL-Classifications: G14; G15; G18; K22.
Keywords: analyst conferences; conference calls; disclosure regulation; financial ana-
lysts; forecast accuracy; information environment.
II
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate whether conference calls provide additional information to
the analyst community that cannot be accessed via other types of disclosure. The com-
plementary view suggests that analysts infer new material information during conference
calls. This can occur, for example, during management presentations or interactions with
management and fellow analysts. Alternatively, conference calls may merely serve as
just another method of distributing the same information that was (previously) released
through other information channels, e.g., earnings announcements. This view presumes
that conference calls are a substitute for disclosing information in other ways. Our study
provides evidence that conference calls convey extra information to analysts, beyond that
contained in corresponding earnings announcements, lending support to a complementary
informational role of conference calls.
So far, research on this question has exclusively focused on the US setting. The effects
of firm disclosure on analysts’ forecasts, however, are likely to depend on the institutional
framework (e.g., Basu et al., 1998; Chang et al., 2000; Hope, 2003b). Therefore, the results
from the US may not generalise to other forecasting environments. The German forecasting
environment has been perceived to be very different from both that of the US and that
of the UK (Capstaff et al., 1998; Bolliger, 2004). For instance, prior studies show that
German analysts’ forecasting accuracy is relatively poor compared to that of analysts from
Anglo-Saxon countries (Chang et al., 2000; Ang and Ciccone, 2001; Capstaff et al., 2001;
Clement et al., 2003; Hope, 2003b; Hope, 2003a; Hope, 2004), their recommendations
add less value than the recommendations of US analysts (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006),
quarterly forecasts are less common, a smaller number of public firms are covered by
analysts (Daske and Wiesenbach, 2005), German analysts have less experience than their
US counterparts (Clement et al., 2003) and German brokerage houses are smaller (Naujoks
et al., 2009). The differences in the forecasting environments have been attributed to the
stronger insider-orientation of the German disclosure system (Capstaff et al., 1998; Chang
et al., 2000; Ang and Ciccone, 2001; Hope, 2004). Given the environmental differences, we
see a clear motivation to focus our research question on the German setting. While there
are conspicuous differences between the German and the US and UK settings, the former
is, however, far from being unique in the European context. France, Italy, Spain and other
countries in Continental Europe are fairly similar in terms of the relative importance of
equity markets and in their information environments. Thus, although this study only
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examines German data, we believe that our results may extend to companies from other
Continental European countries as well.
In Germany, in 2003, the Deutsche Bo¨rse Group introduced the obligation, for firms
listed in the stock market segment Prime Standard, to host at least one conference call
per year (Section 68 of the Exchange Rules for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). The
stronger insider-orientation of the German information environment may influence how
these conference calls affect analysts’ forecasts. On the one hand, if firms seriously commit
themselves to greater transparency, the effects of additional disclosure via conference calls
should be more pronounced in such a setting and easier to substantiate empirically than for
the richer US or UK disclosure systems (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). On the other hand,
the mere (mandatory) introduction of conference calls as a disclosure mechanism may only
have negligible effects, because firms’ incentives to publicly provide additional information
may be low. In addition, analysts may not be trained well enough to accurately process
firm-provided information.
Our main empirical analysis follows an approach outlined by Bowen et al. (2002):
First, we measure forecast error and forecast dispersion before and after earnings an-
nouncements. Next, we isolate the effect of conference calls on analysts’ forecasts, by
comparing the change in forecast error and forecast dispersion between quarters where
firms host earnings-related conference calls (conference call quarters) and quarters where
firms do not host conference calls (non-conference call quarters) concurrent with the earn-
ings release. For a sample of 3,673 earnings announcements by German firms between
2004 and 2007, we find that forecast error decreases more in quarters where firms host
conference calls in conjunction with earnings announcements than in non-conference call
quarters. The relatively greater decrease in the forecast error persists over time, indicating
a sustained effect of conference calls on the information endowment of analysts. These res-
ults still hold after a series of robustness tests are applied. Within-firm tests corroborate
the results of our panel regressions.
Overall, our findings suggest that valuable new information is released during confer-
ence calls, meaning that conference calls constitute increased disclosure. When contrasted
with results for the US, as reported by Bowen et al. (2002), the reduction in forecast er-
ror in the German sample is economically larger. This is consistent with the view that
commitments to provide additional disclosures are likely to result in larger effects within a
disclosure system that is less stringent than the US environment (Verrecchia, 2001, p. 175;
Leuz and Wysocki, 2008, p. 29). In a supplemental analysis, we shed light on the question
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of whether all financial analysts benefit equally from the information disseminated during
conference calls. Partitioning them into high- and low-ability analysts, based on their prior
forecasting ability, reveals that both groups benefit equally from conference calls.
As regards forecast dispersion, we generally fail to detect a statistically significant
change during conference call quarters. We find only weak evidence of an increase in fore-
cast dispersion during conference call quarters for the longer measurement period. To gain
a deeper insight into the the relation between forecast dispersion and conference calls, we
separate forecast dispersion into its underlying theoretical components, uncertainty and
information asymmetry, where forecast dispersion is an increasing function of both (Bar-
ron, Stanford and Yu, 2009). We find that overall uncertainty declines after conference
calls, while there is a strong increase in information asymmetry among analysts. Thus,
the absence of a detectable change in the forecast dispersion after conference calls suggests
that the decrease in uncertainty is offset by a proportionate increase in information asym-
metry. This finding is consistent with theoretical models (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994)
and empirical evidence (e.g., Barron et al., 2002) demonstrating that anticipated public
disclosure can lead to increased information asymmetry, because analysts generate new
private information in addition to the public information released during such disclosure
events.
Research on the role of conference calls in the flow of information in the German
capital market should be of great interest to regulators in Europe. In recent years, the
European Commission has undertaken many efforts to assure that relevant information is
made available in a timely fashion to all investors in European markets.1 Current practice
in Germany shows that the vast majority of conference calls are closed calls, i.e., access to
conference calls is limited to invited participants.2 The evidence presented in this paper
suggests that restricting access to conference calls places non-invited market participants
1For instance, in January 2003 the Directive 2003/6/EC was adopted. Its objective is to preclude the
selective disclosure of information. The directive contains three main elements: insider dealing, ad-
hoc publicity and market manipulation. In Germany, Section 15 WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz,
in English: German Security Act) was passed in 1995, requiring listed firms to instantly publish all
information that may substantially influence stock prices through ad-hoc press releases. Further, Section
15a WpHG was introduced in the year 2002, establishing that trading activities in a firm’s stock by
corporate insiders (directors’ dealings) must be disclosed.
2Following Bushee et al. (2003) and Skinner (2003), we understand ”open access conferences” as providing
unlimited access to all available information to the universe of capital market participants at the same
point in time. For instance, live broadcasts of conference calls calls via the internet (e.g., webcasts)
that are open to all interested parties meet these requirements. Drawing a random sample of 80 firms
from our full sample of 352 and calling the firms’ investor relations agents in February 2010 revealed
that 86% of these firms conduct conference calls as closed calls.
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at a (temporary) informational disadvantage. In the US, the SEC addressed the issue of
selective disclosure and mandated open access to conference calls with the passing of the
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in the year 2000. In contrast, in the most important
capital markets of Continental Europe, including those of Germany, France, Italy, and
Spain as well as the UK, there is still no requirement for firms to grant open access to
conference calls for all interested parties. Therefore, our paper contributes to a regulatory
debate aimed at levelling the informational playing field among investors in Europe.
In addition, managers, investors and academics should be interested in learning about
the informational role of conference calls. This is particularly true in light of the fact
that conference calls have become a frequently-used means of conveying information from
management to analysts in Germany in recent years. Managers need to understand how
financial analysts process information so as to be able to communicate effectively with
them (Bradshaw, 2011, p. 2). Investors need to understand how conference calls affect
the information environment of analysts, because they use analysts’ forecasts of future
earnings in their valuation models or follow analysts’ stock recommendations in making
their investment decisions. Finally, academics studying the effects of public disclosure on
the expected cost of equity capital using analysts’ forecasts, should try to gain a deeper
understanding of the determinants of analysts’ forecast errors (Easton, 2009, p. 335).
This paper extends prior research in the following ways. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to analyse how conference calls affect analysts’ forecasts in a non-US
type setting. Examining the informational effect of conference calls in Germany helps
provide an understanding of their role in the corporate disclosure process in a less stringent
disclosure environment. Prior research has generally only examined differences in the
levels of accuracy and bias in earnings forecasts within or across European countries (e.g.,
Capstaff et al., 1998; Capstaff et al., 2001; Beckers et al., 2004; Bolliger, 2004). Our paper
extends this literature by examining how a specific disclosure event can lead to changes
in the properties of analysts’ forecasts. Moreover, focusing on conference calls allows us
to add evidence on the immediate effects of the interaction between management and
analysts on the information production of analysts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop the research question
underlying the paper and our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research framework and
section 4 reports the sample selection procedure. The results of our main empirical analysis,
examining the effect of conference calls on forecast error and dispersion, are provided in
section 5. Section 6 contains supplemental tests analysing the relation between conference
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calls and analysts’ information precision, and the question of whether all analysts benefit
equally from conference calls, as well as robustness tests for our main analysis. Concluding
remarks are presented in the final section.
2 Research Question and Hypotheses Development
A stylised model of the analyst information processing around earnings announcements is
provided in Figure 1.3 The process starts out with an earnings forecast that is based on
the information endowment of the analyst prior to the earnings release (Earnings forecast
PRE). In the next step, firms announce their earnings numbers via press releases and fin-
ancial reports on their websites. This usually happens before markets open or in the early
hours of a trading day. In addition to the earnings release, some firms host a conference
call later that same day (CC quarter). Conference calls typically begin with a management
presentation lasting 15-20 minutes, in which managers provide their interpretation of the
firm’s latest earnings. This section is followed by a 25-40 minute-long question-and-answer
session during which analysts can ask the management open questions and try to elicit
additional information that is not disclosed elsewhere. Subsequently, the analysts process
the information collected during the conference call, including it in their post-call earnings
forecasts (Earnings forecast POST).
[Insert Figure 1]
The focus of this study is to analyse whether these conference calls convey information
to analysts beyond that provided by the accompanying earnings releases. If conference
calls provide information incremental to that in the earnings announcements, this should
be reflected in post- vs. pre-differences in the forecast properties when compared across
conference call quarters (CC quarters) and non-conference call quarters (NCC quarters).
Alternatively, conference calls may not provide additional information to the analyst com-
munity, because they may only contain the same information as is released through other
information channels. In fact, a frequently-cited motivation for the use of conference calls
is that they serve as a substitute for direct contact with analysts (e.g., Lang, 1998, p.
171). The argument is that conference calls are a more efficient means to communicate
information that otherwise would be disclosed, for instance, through numerous individual
3See also Bradshaw (2009) for a schematic of analyst information processing.
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calls. If this is the case, the amount of overall disclosure should be the same for confer-
ence call quarters as for non-conference call quarters, only the medium is different. Then,
any observed change in analyst forecast properties could not be attributed to conference
calls per se. This would rather imply that analysts differ primarily in their information
processing.
However, there are several reasons why we expect conference calls to convey new, ma-
terial information to analysts.4 First of all, the fact that analysts participate in conference
calls indicates that these calls are likely to provide additional information (Frankel et al.,
1999; Bowen et al., 2002). Further, several research papers provide direct evidence of
the complementary informational role of conference calls. Barron, Byard and Yu (2009)
find that the question-and-answer section of conference calls helps analysts to trigger new
private information by facilitating their analysis of firms’ financial statement disclosures
that are released with earnings announcements. Using conference call audio files, Mayew
and Venkatachalam (2011) show that managerial vocal cues convey additional informa-
tion about firms’ fundamentals beyond quantitative earnings information. Matsumoto
et al. (2011) show, by analysing transcripts of conference calls, that the presentation and
discussion sections of conference calls are incrementally informative. There is also more
indirect evidence that conference calls represent important information events. Studies
focusing on capital market reactions during conference calls find unusually large return
volatility and abnormally high trading volumes (Frankel et al., 1999; Bushee et al., 2003;
Bushee et al., 2004). Bowen et al. (2002) show, for the US setting, that conference calls
reduce forecast error and forecast dispersion in the period around the call. They conclude
that conference calls increase the information available to analysts and thus enhance their
ability to forecast earnings accurately.
Moreover, in informal discussions with the authors, German analysts particularly
stressed the importance of the open, interactive nature of the question-and-answer sec-
tion, in which they have the opportunity to uncover information that was not discussed in
the earnings release.5 They also pointed out that conference calls convey valuable inform-
4Also, our research design includes several features to ensure that any observable change in forecast
properties is primarily attributable to the information released during conference calls and not to
differences in the analysts’ information processing across conference call quarters and non-conference
call quarters (see section 3).
5There is evidence that (1) managers discriminate among analysts by allowing them to ask questions
conditional on how favourably the analyst views the firm (Mayew, 2008) and (2) managers withhold
information by not answering analysts’ questions (Hollander et al., 2010). However, a manager’s un-
willingness to disclose is also likely to serve as an informative signal to analysts.
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ation beyond the earnings numbers, for instance, through managerial body language or
linguistic style. In addition, evidence from a limited sample of conference call transcripts
suggests that German firms disclose specific information during conference calls that is
not contained in earnings announcements.
Forecast error and forecast dispersion may be affected by public or private information
(Byard and Shaw, 2003). In formulating our predictions, we rely on an analytical frame-
work outlined by Barron et al. (1998), hereafter BKLS. They derive how the precision (or
quality) of analysts’ public and private information is transformed into earnings forecasts.
In the BKLS model each analyst possesses public information that is common to all ana-
lysts and private information that is idiosyncratic. If additional information is released
during conference calls, the precision of the public information available to analysts should
increase. Theoretical models and empirical studies demonstrate that public disclosure can
play a complementary role around the brief window of an anticipated disclosure event
(e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Kim and Verrecchia, 1997; Bar-
ron et al., 2002; Barron et al., 2005).6 In other words, these studies indicate that analysts
also develop new private information in conjunction with a conference call. Consistent
with this view, Mayew (2008), p. 629, notes: ”If analyst questions are conditioned on the
asking analyst’s existing unique private information, the public answer, while heard by all
analysts, can yield uniquely private information for the analyst asking the question relative
to other analysts.”
An increase in the precision of public and/or private information reduces analysts’
uncertainty about future earnings and should therefore lead to a decrease in the error
in the mean forecast. It is important to note, however, that in the BKLS model the
effect of a greater precision of public information on the forecast error only holds if the
public information is more precise than private information. Hence, whether the error in
the mean forecast increases or decreases following an increase in the precision of public
information depends on the relative preciseness of public and private information. Given
the availability of numerous (mandatory) public disclosure channels such as annual reports,
quarterly reports, press releases, etc., we argue that, on average, public information is more
6Increased public disclosure may also substitute for analysts’ private information because public inform-
ation mitigates the gains from private information (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1991), i.e., conference
calls may reduce analysts’ incentive to acquire private information (substitutional effect). However, the
substitution effect typically occurs when firms make a long-run commitment to greater public disclosure,
while the complementary effect is more likely a response to anticipated public disclosure events such as
conference calls (Verrecchia, 2001, p. 172).
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precise than private information (Bowen et al., 2002, p. 314).7 Therefore, if conference
calls increase the precision of public and/or private information, we predict that conference
calls will be associated with a decrease in the forecast error:
Hypothesis 1: The forecast error of analysts decreases relatively more for
quarters in which firms host conference calls than for non-conference call quar-
ters.
Regarding the effect of conference calls on forecast dispersion, predictions are less
straightforward. In the BKLS framework increased precision of public information re-
duces analysts’ forecast dispersion, when private information is held constant. However,
an increase in the precision of private information leads to a greater divergence of beliefs
among analysts, i.e., higher information asymmetry. This can lead to an increase in fore-
cast dispersion. Thus, the overall effect of conference calls on analysts’ forecast dispersion
depends on the relative increase in public and private information. Since the overall rela-
tion between conference calls and forecast dispersion remains unclear ex ante, we test the
following non-directional hypothesis (stated in the null form):
Hypothesis 2: Forecast dispersion is unaffected during conference call quar-
ters.
3 Research Design
3.1 Development of Dependent Variables
Following an approach outlined by Bowen et al. (2002), we first measure changes in forecast
error (∆ERROR) and dispersion (∆DISP) for each earnings announcement date. We use
changes in forecast error and dispersion, in order to isolate the effect of the information
released during the time period over which the changes are measured. Employing a changes
(rather than a levels) specification also mitigates the effect of cross-sectional differences
in firms’ information environments (Bowen et al., 2002, p. 297; Irani, 2004, p. 18). As a
second step, we compare ∆ERROR and ∆DISP across conference call and non-conference
7In the BKLS framework private information is by definition uncorrelated. Since it is unlikely that all
the information released by managers in private conversations with analysts is unique, much of this
information is most likely considered as public information in the BKLS framework (Bowen et al., 2002,
p. 315).
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call quarters to capture the effect of conference calls on the information environment
of the analysts. We follow prior research on the German stock market and use annual
earnings forecasts in our empirical analysis, because quarterly forecasts are not commonly
available. As a result, we examine how conference calls concurrent with the prior year’s
annual earnings announcement (EA-Q4t-1) and subsequent earnings announcements in the
first (EA-Q1t), second (EA-Q2t) and third (EA-Q3t) quarters of the current year affect
analysts’ ability to forecast the annual earnings of the current year (EA-Q4t) (see Figure
2).
Forecast error (ERROR) is defined as the absolute difference between the mean of
forecasted earnings per share and actual earnings per share.8 Dispersion (DISP) is defined
as the standard deviation of individual analysts’ forecasts. We measure ERROR and
DISP at two different points in time: before (PRE) and after (POST) a quarterly earnings
announcement. We scale these measures by the stock price to control for differences in
price-earnings levels across firms:
∆ERROR =
|ERRORPOST| − |ERRORPRE|




share price at PRE horizon date
(2)
A negative value for ∆ERROR implies a decrease in forecast error over the meas-
urement period and, thus, is associated with increased forecast accuracy and vice versa.
Similarly, a negative value for ∆DISP indicates a decrease in forecast dispersion over the
measurement period and vice versa.
As Figure 2 depicts, we set the PRE horizon date four days before the earnings
announcement date of a given quarter. To reduce the probability of confounding events,
we choose a considerably shorter event window than Bowen et al. (2002), who set the PRE
horizon date as the beginning of the quarter.9 Our post-measure POST1 ends 20 days
after the earnings announcement, which gives analysts 20 days to revise their forecasts.
8We do not use the I/B/E/S consensus forecast, because we place additional restrictions on the calculation
of the forecast error; these are outlined in Table 1 in Section 4.
9For our sample (N = 2,538 earnings announcements) the average time period between the beginning of
the quarter and EA-Q4t-1 (i.e., the announcement of the Q4t-1 earnings) is 79 days, for EA-Q1t: 39
days, EA-Q2t: 38 days, and EA-Q3t: 39 days.
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Changes in forecast accuracy and dispersion between PRE and POST1 are denoted as
∆ERROR1 and ∆DISP1, respectively. A quarter is considered as a conference call quarter
if a firm hosts a conference call within a nine-day time period, beginning three days before
and ending five days after the announcement of the prior quarter’s earnings (-3;+5). We
choose this narrow time window to ensure that the conference call is associated with an
earnings release. By focusing only on conference calls held in conjunction with earnings
announcements, we reduce the possibility that the decision to host a conference call is
endogenously determined (Bowen et al., 2002, p. 296). We classify quarters where firms
do not host a conference call during the nine-day window as non-conference call quarters.
The use of non-conference call firms also controls for a general increase in the disclosure
quality of German firms in recent years, as documented by Glaum et al. (2011).
[Insert Figure 2]
In addition, we measure forecast error and dispersion at a later point in time (denoted
POST2). This grants analysts an additional 30 days to adjust their forecasts after the
earnings release (in total 50 days).10 Extending the measurement period allows us to
examine whether conference calls have a long-term effect on analysts’ forecasts. If non-
conference call firms ”catch up”with conference call firms by providing relevant information
through other disclosure channels after the POST1 horizon date but before POST2, the
effect of conference calls may only be temporary. If this is the case, should observe similar
changes in forecast accuracy (∆ERROR2) and dispersion (∆DISP2) for conference call and
non-conference call firms in the POST2 horizon. For each of the measurement dates (PRE,
POST1 and POST2), we use the most recent outstanding forecast from each individual
analyst to compute the mean forecast. To reduce the potential effect of stale forecasts, we
only include those issued within a 90-day window before the measurement date. We then
match each analyst’s pre- and post-conference call forecasts and retain only those made
by analysts with forecasts at all three horizon dates.
3.2 Panel Regression Analysis
To test the effect of conference calls on the properties of analysts’ forecasts, we adopt and
extend a model by Bowen et al. (2002). In addition to using changes in forecast measures
10Bowen et al. (2002) set the POST2 time horizon at the earnings release date of the next interim earnings.
Our research design ensures that information coming along with the next interim earnings release is
not included in ∆ERROR2. Also, a constant time frame of an additional 30 days gives all firms the
same amount of time to ”catch up”.
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rather than levels, we include several control variables in the model to control for potential
differences in firms’ information environments. Specifically, we run the following ordinary
least square (OLS) regressions:
∆ERROR1(2)i,q,t = β0 + β1CCi,q,t + β2SIZEi,q,t + β3SURPi,q,t + β4∆AGE1(2)i,q,t
+β5ERRORPRE,i,q,t + β6NOi,q,t +
∑
βjFixed Effects + ,
(3)
∆DISP1(2)i,q,t = β0 + β1CCi,q,t + β2SIZEi,q,t + β3SURPi,q,t + β4∆AGE1(2)i,q,t
+β5DISPPRE,i,q,t + β6NOi,q,t +
∑
βjFixed Effects + .
(4)
where:
i, q, t = Firm, Quarter, Year.
∆ERROR1(2)i,q,t = (ERRORPOST1(2),i,q,t - ERRORPRE,i,q,t)/Pi,q,t: Error in the mean forecast at
POST1(2) less the error in the mean forecast at PRE, deflated by price at
PRE.
∆DISP1(2)i,q,t = (DISPPOST1(2),i,q,t - DISPPRE,i,q,t)/Pi,q,t: Standard deviation of analysts’ fore-
casts at POST1(2) less the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts at PRE,
deflated by price at PRE.
CCi,q,t = Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a quarter is a conference call quarter,
and 0 otherwise.
SIZEi,q,t = Market value of equity at beginning of quarter (for our empirical tests we use
the log of the market value).
SURPi,t = (|EPSi,t - EPSi,t-1|)/Pi,t-1: Absolute value of the earnings per share for the
current fiscal year less the earnings per share for the prior fiscal year, deflated
by the share price at the end of the prior fiscal year.
∆AGE1(2)i,q,t = Average age of analysts’ forecasts measured at POST1(2) less the average age
of analysts’ forecasts measured at PRE.
ERRORPRE,i,q,t = Error in the mean forecast measured at PRE, deflated by price at PRE.
DISPPRE,i,q,t = Forecast dispersion measured at PRE, deflated by price at PRE.
NOi,q,t = Number of analysts following, with forecasts no older than 90 days at PRE,
POST1 and POST2.
Fixed Effects = Industry and quarter-year fixed effects.
Previous literature has shown that size affects the level of information available about
a firm (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996). As a proxy for SIZE, we use the firm’s market
value of equity.11 Furthermore, we include an earnings surprise variable (SURP), defined
11Results are qualitatively similar if we choose total assets as a proxy for SIZE.
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as the change in earnings relative to the prior year, to control for the analysts’ difficulty in
forecasting earnings (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Bowen et al., 2002). In addition, we use
the difference in the age of the mean forecasts (AGE) at the PRE and POST measurement
dates to control for staleness in the forecasts, which would potentially increase the levels of
forecast error and forecast dispersion (e.g., Brown, 2001). The variable AGE also captures
the tendency of analysts to revise their forecasts after conference calls.
Further, we incorporate the pre-levels of forecast error (ERRORPRE) and dispersion
(DISPPRE) into our regressions. The initial levels are likely to be affected by the richness
of a firm’s information environment. Firms with lower pre-levels of forecast error and
dispersion also have less room to improve after a conference call. We also add the number of
analysts following (NO) to our regression model. NO serves as a proxy for the competition
among analysts, which can produce incentives to revise annual forecasts after interim
earnings announcements (Stickel, 1989, p. 279). In order to eliminate the influence of
the industrial sector on analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Brown, 1997; Capstaff et al., 2001), we
include industry fixed effects. This allows us to capture any unobserved, time-invariant
heterogeneity across industries. Finally, we introduce quarter-year fixed effects to account
for the quarterly structure of our panel data set and to control for time trends (Christensen
et al., 2011).
The incremental effect of conference calls may also depend on a firm’s accounting
regime, because earnings numbers prepared under international accounting standards are
arguably more informative than those prepared under local standards. However, we do
not control for the presence of international accounting standards. The reason for this is
that our sample firms were required to apply either IFRS or US-GAAP in 2005 and many
firms had already made the switch by the start of our investigation period in 2004.
3.3 Within-Firm Analysis
In addition to our panel regression analysis, we employ within-firm tests which control
for (unobserved) firm-specific factors that are constant over time (Bowen et al., 2002,
p. 298). Specifically, we compare – for the same firm – changes in forecast error and
dispersion during conference call quarters with changes in the forecast measures during
non-conference call quarters one year earlier. These tests allow us to analyse how analysts’
forecasts are affected if a firm (re-)commences hosting conference calls in a given quarter.
12








CC = Conference call quarter.
NCC = Non-conference call quarter.
For definitions of ∆ERROR1(2) and ∆DISP1(2), see Figure 2.
We expect the change in forecast error to be higher in conference-call quarters than
in non-conference call quarters, which implies a negative value for ∆∆ERROR1(2). For
reasons discussed in section 2, we offer no directional hypothesis for ∆∆DISP1(2).
4 Sample Selection and Data Collection
Our sample selection procedure starts out with 352 German firms listed in the Prime
Standard Index of the Deutsche Bo¨rse Group (as of March 2009). The Prime Standard
is the stock market segment with the strongest transparency requirements in Germany.
Notably, all firms included in the Prime Standard must report their earnings on a quarterly
basis and are obliged to conduct at least one conference call per year. Additionally, they
must provide a financial calendar on their website, with the dates of all important corporate
events such as earnings releases and conference calls.
As summarised in Table 1, the data collection process involves the following steps:
First, we identify the earnings release dates for all 352 firms between 2004 and 2007.
There are several databases (e.g., investor-facts.de, dvfa.de, earnings.com) covering the
earnings release dates of German firms. However, cross-checks with firms’ websites reveal
that these data are far from being complete and sometimes even erroneous. Therefore,
we gather all earnings release dates by manually checking the firms’ financial calendars
on their websites and their financial reports. This search yields a total of 4,449 earnings
release dates. This is less than the theoretical maximum amount of 5,632 earnings releases
because some firms entered the Prime Standard after 2004. Secondly, we also manually
check whether a conference call is hosted within a nine-day window (-3;+5) surrounding
an identified earnings announcement. Current practice indicates that the conference call
date coincides with the date the earnings release is published. In our analysis we consider
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all earnings-related conference calls, regardless of whether they are held physically or as a
telephone/webcast conference.12 This procedure yields 2,099 conference call quarters and
2,350 non-conference call quarters.
[Insert Table 1]
Next, we merge our initial sample with forecast data provided by I/B/E/S. Since
not all of our sample firms are covered by I/B/E/S analysts, we lose 776 observations.
This results in a preliminary sample of 3,673 earnings announcements comprising 1,875
conference call quarters and 1,798 non-conference call quarters, with corresponding forecast
data from I/B/E/S. Finally, we place additional restrictions on the combined sample when
conducting our tests (see Table 1). We delete all observations with no forecast revision
within a 90-day window before each measurement date to ensure that only analysts who
actively follow the firm are included in the computation of forecast error and dispersion.
The 90-day maximum age restriction does not necessarily imply that forecasts need to be
revised between the PRE and the POST1 or POST2 time horizons. Therefore, it is also
possible that some forecasts in the POST measures are actually made prior to an earnings
release. No revision would indicate that the earnings release and/or the conference call
did not provide additional information prompting the analyst to adjust annual forecasts.13
Furthermore, we discard observations for which the prior year’s actual EPS value is not
available because we also include in our regression model the change in earnings relative to
the prior year as a proxy for the analyst’s difficulty in forecasting earnings (see section 3.2).
We also delete observations for the POST1(2)-samples for which the time period between
subsequent earnings announcements is less than 24 (54) days, so as to avoid overlapping
measurement periods.14
In order to calculate forecast dispersion, we require at least two forecasts to be cur-
rently outstanding. For the empirical tests, we also delete the top and bottom 1% of all
12In Germany, conference calls related to the annual earnings announcement are usually held physically,
while conference calls in conjunction with quarterly earnings releases are conducted as telephone and/or
webcast access conferences. This information was inferred during several informal conversations between
the authors and investor relations officers from Prime Standard firms.
13However, we control for the age of forecasts in our multivariate regressions. Also, in sensitivity tests
we only include observations for which forecasts are revised within the 20 days following an earnings
announcement.
14For our sample (N = 2,538 earnings announcements), the average time period between subsequent earn-
ings announcements for EA-Q4t-1→EA-Q1t is 50 days, for EA-Q1t→EA-Q2t: 91 days, EA-Q2t→EA-
Q3t: 92 days, and EA-Q3t→EA-Q4t: 130 days.
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dependent variables. Our final ∆ERROR1(2)-sample comprises 2,338 (2,023) observations
and our final ∆DISP1(2)-sample comprises 1,848 (1,580) observations.
5 Main Empirical Analyses
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Results of Univariate Tests
Figure 3 plots the frequency of individual forecasts revisions around earnings announce-
ments for conference call quarters and non-conference call quarters separately.
[Insert Figure 3]
It is apparent that revisions of individual analysts’ forecasts are highly concentrated
in the period starting with the earnings announcement date (day 0) and ending two days
after the earnings announcement (day +2). However, the percentage of forecast revisions
is higher for conference call quarters (19%) than for non-conference call quarters (13%).
This indicates that analysts are more likely to revise their forecasts when a firm hosts a
conference call in conjunction with the earnings announcement.
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the dependent, explanatory and
control variables for the combined sample of treatment and control group. Decreases
in forecast error scaled by share price occur both in the shorter (-4;+20 days) window
(∆ERROR1) and in the longer (-4;+50 days) window (∆ERROR2). They are significantly
different from zero according to both t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Changes in
forecast dispersion (∆DISP1(2)) generally exhibit a positive sign, except for the median
in the POST2 window, indicating that forecast dispersion tends to increase. However,
as a percentage of share price, changes in forecast dispersion appear to be smaller than
changes in forecast error and are not significantly different from zero. For the ∆ERROR1-
(∆DISP1-)sample, approximately 60% (68%) of all earnings announcements are in con-
junction with conference calls.
The mean (median) market value of equity, our proxy for firm size (SIZE), is 743 (566)
million EUR for the pooled sample. The negative sign for ∆AGE1, which is the average
age of earnings forecasts at the POSTl horizon less the average age of earnings forecasts
at the PRE horizon, suggests that forecasts at the PRE horizon date are older than at the
POST1 horizon date. Thus, on average, analysts revise their forecasts subsequent to an
earnings announcement date. The positive value of ∆AGE2 indicates that forecasts are
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more recent at the PRE time horizon than at the POST2 time horizon. This leads to the
conclusion that only some analysts revise their forecasts (again) in the ”catch up” period.
The pre-announcement level of forecast error (ERRORPRE) is 4.4% (of share price)
for our combined sample and, as such, larger than for US firms.15 This is in line with prior
research demonstrating that the forecasting accuracy of German analysts is relatively poor
compared to that of analysts from Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., Clement et al., 2003). The
mean (median) number of active analysts following (NO) is around 7 (5).
[Insert Table 2]
Univariate tests comparing changes in forecast measures across conference call quarters
and non-conference call quarters are presented in Table 3. Consistent with hypothesis 1,
the decrease in ∆ERROR1 is significantly higher in quarters where firms host conference
calls concurrent with earnings announcements than it is in non-conference call quarters,
as indicated by both the parametric and non-parametric tests. ∆ERROR2 is significantly
lower for conference call quarters, indicating that the reduction in the forecast error also
persists through the longer POST2 period. As a percentage of the pre-announcement level
of forecast error (ERRORPRE), the decreases in forecast error for conference call quarters
and non-conference call quarters have means (medians) of 8.68% (7.27%) and 3.82% (0%)
in the POST1 period, respectively. The absolute decrease in forecast error scaled by price,
0.3%, remains large when contrasted with the result for the US of 0.09%, as documented
by Bowen et al. (2002). These numbers suggest that the stronger reduction in the forecast
error for conference call firms is also significant in economic terms.
[Insert Table 3]
Forecast dispersion goes up in the mean but declines in the median after conference
calls. We fail to find significant differences for the change in forecast dispersion between
conference call quarters and non-conference call quarters. As regards our control variables
capturing firms’ information environment, Table 3 shows that larger firms (SIZE) and firms
with more analysts following them (NO) host conference calls more frequently. Further,
the change in the average age of the forecasts (∆AGE1 and ∆AGE2) is significantly greater
15For the combined sample, Bowen et al. (2002), p. 300, report an average initial level of forecast error of
0.4% (of share price). It should be noted that the larger initial level of forecast error for our German
sample may also be partly attributable to the use of annual earnings forecasts (which are more difficult
to predict due to the longer forecast horizon), while the study of Bowen et al. (2002) for the US setting
is based on quarterly earnings forecasts. However, for our German sample, the initial forecast error
one-quarter ahead (at EA-Q3t) of the forecasted annual earnings (EA-Q4t) is still 2.6% (of share price).
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in conference call quarters than in non-conference call quarters, confirming that analysts
are more likely to revise their forecasts in quarters where firms host a conference call.
5.2 Results of Multivariate Tests
Table 4 provides the results of the multivariate analyses. Statistical inferences are based
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. We test hypothesis 1, positing that
the error in the mean forecast decreases relatively more for quarters in which firms host
conference calls than for non-conference call quarters, in models 1 and 2. As expected, the
coefficients of our main test variable CC are significantly negative (p-values < 0.01) in both
models. These results suggest that, both in the shorter (∆ERROR1) and in the longer
event-window (∆ERROR2), the forecast error decreases significantly more for conference
call quarters than for quarters where firms do not host conference calls. Therefore, we
conclude that, consistent with hypothesis 1, conference calls convey additional information
beyond the information provided by earnings announcements.
In the short-term, the decrease in forecast error is approximately 0.19% (of price)
greater in conference call quarters than in non-conference call quarters. This difference
accounts for 52% of the interquartile range of ∆ERROR1.16 For ∆ERROR2, the difference
is about 0.36% (of price) and 72% of the interquartile range. These relations indicate that
the stronger reduction in forecast error for conference call quarters is also of economic
significance. When compared to results for the US setting, as reported by Bowen et al.
(2002), revisions in analysts’ forecast estimates following conference calls are larger in
economic terms for our sample of German firms.17 These magnitudes are consistent with
the idea that increased disclosure can yield greater effects in a less stringent forecasting
environment (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Hail, 2002). The coefficients of the control
variables SIZE, ∆AGE1(2) and NO are all highly significant.18 ERRORPRE and SURP
have coefficients that are insignificant.
[Insert Table 4]
16We obtain this result by dividing the coefficent of CC (0.00187) by the interquartile range of ∆ERROR1
(0.00015 - (-0.00345) = 0.00360).
17Bowen et al. (2002), p. 304, find that the decrease in forecast error is approximately 0.013% (of price)
or 21% of the interquartile range.
18SIZE and NO are positively correlated, with a coefficient of 0.76 (not tabulated). We assess the presence
of multicollinearity by dropping either SIZE or NO from the regression model. The results remain qual-
itatively similar. Also, VIF statistics do not indicate that multicollinearity presents a severe problem
in our regressions.
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In a further set of analyses, we use the individual forecast error instead of the error in
the mean forecast as the dependent variable. The regression results presented in models 3
and 4 show that the coefficient of our main variable of interest, CC, is significantly negative
(p-values < 0.01). This corroborates our previous findings.
We test hypothesis 2, stating that forecast dispersion is unaffected during conference
call quarters, in models 5 and 6. The coefficients of the conference call dummy CC are
positive in both models, indicating that forecast dispersion tends to increase during con-
ference call quarters. However, only the coefficient for the POST2 window is statistically
significant (p-value: 0.04). Thus, there is weak evidence that forecast dispersion increases
relatively more for conference call quarters than for non-conference call quarters for the
longer time horizon. None of the control variables enter significantly into our models 5
and 6 (except for SURP).
The lack of statistical significance in model 5 may be due to the skewness of forecast
dispersion. To address this issue, we repeat our tests using ∆LogDISP1, which is defined as
the change in dispersion based on the natural log of forecast dispersion levels (LogDISPPRE
and LogDISPPOST). Untabulated results show that the log transformation greatly mitig-
ates the skewness in the level of forecast dispersion. While almost all control variables
turn significant (SURP, ∆AGE1, DISPPRE, and NO), the coefficient estimate for the con-
ference call dummy CC remains insignificant. Thus, using the change in log-transformed
dispersion as the dependent variable does not alter our conclusions.19
5.3 Results of Within-Firm Tests
Table 5 displays the results of the within-firm, across-time analysis. In line with expect-
ations, the sign for ∆∆ERROR1(2) is significantly negative. Thus, consistent with hy-
pothesis 1, forecast error decreases in the mean and median (∆ERROR1(2)) significantly
more for conference call quarters than for non-conference call quarters. These results in-
dicate that, for firms which eventually (re-)commence hosting conference calls in a given
quarter, useful information is released to the analyst community during these conferences.
[Insert Table 5]
Forecast dispersion (∆DISP1(2)) tends to increase when firms host conference calls.
However, we fail to find significant differences between conference call quarters and non-
19We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention.
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conference call quarters. Overall, the results presented in this section confirm the previous
findings from the main regression analysis.
6 Supplemental Analyses
6.1 Conference Calls and Information Precision
In our empirical tests we fail to find significant changes in forecast dispersion during con-
ference call quarters. To further examine the impact of conference calls on the information
set of analysts, we use empirical proxies developed by BKLS and decompose forecast dis-
persion into its underlying theoretical constructs: uncertainty and information asymmetry
(Barron, Stanford and Yu, 2009). This analysis allows us to shed light on how conference
calls affect the two distinct components of forecast dispersion. In the BKLS framework
uncertainty (denoted V) and information asymmetry (denoted 1-ρ) are defined in terms
of observable measures of analysts’ forecasts (BKLS, p. 427):
Uncertainty = V = (1− 1
NO
)D + SE (7)
Information asymmetry = (1− ρ) = 1− SE−
D
NO
(1− 1NO)D + SE
(8)
where:
V = Overall uncertainty.
(1-ρ) = Information asymmetry.
D = Forecast dispersion.
SE = Squared error in the mean forecast.
NO = Number of analysts following.
We calculate values for V and (1-ρ) for the PRE and POST1 horizon date. Since we
are interested in the effect of conference calls on the information environment of analysts,
we test for the signs of the changes in V and (1-ρ) between the PRE and POST1 horizon.
In line with prior research, we discuss the median values of the BKLS proxies.
[Insert Table 6]
The results in Table 6 show that uncertainty significantly declines after each of the
four conference call windows. Information asymmetry among analysts generally goes up,
indicating that a higher share of private information is contained in analysts’ forecasts after
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conference calls. Also, the level of information asymmetry increases as the announcement
of the forecasted annual earnings approaches. This suggests that, while analysts rely more
on public information for long-term forecasts, they incorporate relatively more private
information in their forecasts as the forecast horizon shortens.
As expressed in equation (9), forecast dispersion (D) is an increasing function of both
uncertainty and information asymmetry in the BKLS framework (BKLS, p. 426).
Dispersion = D = V(1− ρ) (9)
where:
D = Forecast dispersion.
V = Overall uncertainty.
(1-ρ) = Information asymmetry.
Since we are unable to detect a significant change in forecast dispersion around confer-
ence calls, it appears that the effect of reduced uncertainty is offset by an increase in
information asymmetry such that forecast dispersion does not change. This finding is
consistent with prior theoretical (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994;
Kim and Verrecchia, 1997) and empirical (e.g., Barron et al., 2002; Barron et al., 2005)
research positing that analysts develop new private information upon anticipated public
disclosure events which in turn leads to an increase in information asymmetry. However,
caution should be exercised when interpreting these results. Naujoks et al. (2009) show
that German analysts engage in anti-herding by overemphasizing their private informa-
tion. This potentially introduces a bias in the BKLS proxy for information asymmetry
(Zitzewitz, 2002, p. 6).
6.2 Do All Analysts Benefit Equally?
Our univariate and multivariate results suggest that conference calls convey additional
information. It is, however, not clear whether all analysts benefit equally from the in-
formation provided during conference calls or whether just a subset of analysts drives the
observed decrease in the forecast error.
To address this question, we partition analysts into two groups according to their fore-
casting ability. Following Bowen et al. (2002), we use a relative ranking of analysts’ prior
forecasting accuracy as a proxy for forecasting ability. First, we calculate mean-adjusted
forecast errors by deducting the average forecast error from the individual analysts’ fore-
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cast errors for each firm. Next, we compute the average mean-adjusted forecast error at
all four PRE horizon dates (EA-Q4t-1, EA-Q1t, EA-Q2t, EA-Q3t) in each fiscal year and
rank analysts according to their average error. We then calculate percentage rank as the
rank value of each analyst divided by the number of analysts ranked which yields scores
ranging from zero to one. We consider analysts with a ranking in the prior fiscal year
better (equal to or less) than 0.5 as high- (low-) ability analysts for the current year.20
Then, we compute for each firm-quarter the average ∆ERROR1(2) for both the high- and
low-ability groups (∆ERROR1(2)HI and ∆ERROR1(2)LO) as well as the average differ-
ence between the two groups (∆ERROR1(2)HI-LO) for firms with at least one analyst in
each group. If the high- (low-) ability group benefits more from the information provided
during conference calls than the low- (high-) ability group then ∆ERROR1(2)HI-LO will
be negative (positive).
We also rank analysts based on the forecasting performance of their respective broker-
age house.21 The ranking follows the same procedure as described above. However, we
compute the average mean-adjusted forecast errors at the brokerage house level rather
than the individual analyst level.
[Insert Table 7]
Table 7 provides univariate comparisons of changes in forecast error by analyst type
for conference call and non-conference call quarters. Panel A shows significantly larger
decreases for ∆ERROR1HI and ∆ERROR1LO in conference call than in non-conference
call quarters, suggesting that both low- and high-ability analysts benefit from conference
calls. For the longer POST2 horizon, ∆ERROR2HI and ∆ERROR2LO are significantly
smaller (more negative) for conference call quarters than for non-conference call quarters
according to the Wilcoxon test, while they are not significantly smaller according to a
t-test.
Turning to the question of whether low- and high-ability analysts benefit equally from
the information disseminated during conference calls, our variable of interest, ∆ERROR1(2)HI-LO,
is not significantly different between conference call vs. non-conference call quarters. Thus,
we fail to find differences in the informational effect of conference calls for different types
20If we use alternative cut-off criteria for the ranking of the analysts, such as upper vs. lower quartile, our
results remain qualitatively similar.
21I/B/E/S has stopped publishing the names of brokerage houses and analysts. They only assign individual
IDs to each brokerage house and analyst, allowing us to track prior performance.
21
of analysts. When we rank analysts according to their brokerage house affiliations, the
results (displayed in Table 7 Panel B) remain qualitatively similar.
We also perform a multivariate test: We regress ∆ERROR1(2)HI-LO on the conference
call dummy (CC) and our control variables.22 If the low-ability group benefits more
from conference calls, we should observe a positive coefficient on the dummy variable CC.
However, untabulated regression results show an insignificant coefficient on CC, supporting
our inferences from the univariate analysis.23
6.3 Sensitivity Analyses for Main Results
We perform several sensitivity tests to validate the results of our main empirical analyses.
First, to further ascertain that our results are not driven by differences in firms’ information
environments, we introduce a control variable labelled CCFIRM to our regression models 1
and 2. CCFIRM takes the value 1 for all firm-quarters (conference call and non-conference
call) for firms that host more than one conference call per calendar year, and 0 otherwise.24
Thus, the coefficient of CCFIRM captures the change in forecast error in non-conference
call quarters for firms that host more than one conference call per year (frequent users)
relative to the change in forecast error for non-conference call quarters for firms that host
just one conference call (mandatory users). For the group of mandatory users, we delete
all conference call quarter observations. Consequently, CC now shows the incremental
effect of hosting a conference call on analysts’ forecasts, for frequent users. Untabulated
results show that the coefficient of CC remains significant, while the coefficient of CCFIRM
is insignificant in all specifications. Thus, the change in forecast error in non-conference
call quarters is not significantly different between frequent and mandatory users. This
suggests that the main results of our paper are not driven by differences in the information
environments of frequent conference call users relative to those of mandatory users.
Secondly, we address an issue related to our sample restriction of only including fore-
casts no older than 90 days at each measurement date (see section 4). Under this restric-
tion, analyst forecasts at the POST1(2) time horizons are possibly the same as at the
PRE time horizon. It can be argued that these forecasts should be included in the PRE
and POST measures, because no revision would indicate that no valuable information is
22In these regressions, we include the difference between the low- and high-ability groups for ∆AGE1(2)
and ERRORPRE, similar to our treatment of the dependent variable.
23Results are available upon request.
24Recall that our sample firms are required by stock market regulations to host at least one conference
call per calendar year.
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released during earnings announcements or conference calls (Bowen et al., 2002, p. 292,
fn. 9). However, as the underlying question of this study is to assess whether conference
calls provide additional information not disclosed in earnings releases, it is empirically in-
teresting if actual revisions after an earnings announcement are more accurate when they
are accompanied by a conference call. Hence, we exclude observations where no revision
has been made within the 20 days following the earnings announcement. Untabulated
regression results confirm our primary findings regarding the changes in forecast error and
forecast dispersion.
Finally, we repeat the multivariate regressions of models 1 and 2, using the error in
the median forecast and the mean of the individual forecast errors, instead of the error
in the mean forecast, as the dependent variable. In all specifications our results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine whether conference calls convey additional information to ana-
lysts beyond that in the accompanying earnings announcements. We consider the German
setting, because it generally reflects a forecasting environment that is very different from
the more thoroughly studied US or UK markets. The differences may influence how con-
ference calls affect analysts’ forecasts. In the Continental European context, however, the
German environment is not too different from those of many other countries. Rather, it
typifies an information system that is fairly similar to those in France, Italy, Spain and
other countries. Therefore, examining conference calls in Germany may help us to un-
derstand the informational role of these conference calls in other European countries as
well.
Our regression results show that forecast error decreases relatively more in quarters
in which firms host conference calls in conjunction with earnings announcements than for
non-conference call quarters. The greater decrease in the forecast error persists over time,
suggesting a sustained informational effect of conference calls. These findings are robust
to a number of control variables and sensitivity tests. Overall, our evidence suggests that
conference calls provide new material information to analysts that is not released through
other types of disclosure. When compared to the results for the US markets, as reported
by Bowen et al. (2002), the observed decrease in forecast error is economically larger. Re-
garding forecast dispersion, we are unable to find significant changes during conference
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call quarters. To examine the source of changes in forecast dispersion, we use empirical
proxies developed by BKLS and separate forecast dispersion into its two theoretical con-
structs: uncertainty and information asymmetry. The results show that, while uncertainty
declines, information asymmetry goes up after conference calls so that forecast dispersion
does not change. A supplemental analysis reveals that both low- and high-ability analysts
benefit from the information distributed during conference calls. However, neither group
of analysts benefits more than the other.
Our results are consistent with the notion that the commitment to increased disclos-
ure should evidence greater effects within less stringent settings than it does in the US
disclosure system, where the effects of additional disclosures are likely to be small (Leuz
and Verrecchia, 2000). Likewise, our findings indicate that results for the US markets
cannot be generalised without empirical testing.
Given that conference calls by German firms are generally restricted, the evidence
presented in this paper suggests that conference call participants gain an informational
advantage relative to non-participants, which leads to selective disclosure. This may be
particularly relevant to European regulators seeking to level the informational playing field
in capital markets, but who have yet to introduce legal requirements to conduct conference
calls on an open-access basis only.
Since we infer the informational role of conference calls from investigating changes in
analysts’ forecasts, the evidence of this paper is necessarily indirect. Future research in
European markets might further explore the content of conference calls using transcripts.
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Conference call quarters Non-conference call quarters
Notes: This figure shows revisions in individual forecasts during 3-day windows relative to an earnings an-
nouncement (day 0) as percentage of total individual forecast revisions during the window [-30;+20] for
conference call quarters and non-conference call quarters separately. Individual forecast revisions are com-
puted as percentage of total individual forecast revisions occurring in a 90-day window [-69;+20] around an










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables
Lower Upper Standard
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Quartile Quartile Deviation
Dependent Variables
∆ERROR1 2,338 −0.00271∗∗∗ −0.00042∗∗∗ −0.08358 0.02213 −0.00345 0.00015 0.00908
∆ERROR2 2,023 −0.00398∗∗∗ −0.00079∗∗∗ −0.11631 0.03233 −0.00470 0.00028 0.01298
∆DISP1 1,848 0.00009 0.00000 −0.01911 0.03764 −0.00108 0.00085 0.00471
∆DISP2 1,580 0.00010 −0.00008 −0.01865 0.03866 −0.00140 0.00103 0.00511
Explanatory Variables
CC (∆ERROR1-sample) 2,338 0.59795 1 0 1 0 1 0.49042
CC (∆DISP1-sample) 1,848 0.68236 1 0 1 0 1 0.46568
Control Variables
SIZE (in EURbn) 2,338 0.74299 0.56585 0.00651 94.97194 0.15802 3.45323 0.00802
SURP 2,338 0.07857 0.02531 0.00000 14.81250 0.01116 0.05692 0.38814
∆AGE1 2,338 −11.05073 −9.00000 −84.00000 24.00000 −28.00000 9.83333 25.67214
∆AGE2 2,023 8.59712 8.00000 −84.00000 54.00000 −9.00000 27.60000 26.53759
ERRORPRE 2,338 0.04369 0.01224 0.00000 5.93149 0.00443 0.03050 0.17798
DISPPRE 1,848 0.01129 0.00611 0.00000 0.56440 0.00315 0.01163 0.02315
NO 2,338 7.39478 5.00000 1.00000 40.00000 2.00000 11.00000 7.05145
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the dependent, explanatory and control variables. For the definition of
dependent variables, see Figure 2. The indices used below are: i = Firm, q = Quarter, t = Year. CCi,q,t = Dummy variable
taking the value 1 if a quarter is a conference call quarter, and 0 otherwise. SIZEi,q,t = Market value of equity at the beginning
of quarter (for our empirical tests we use the log of the market value). SURPi,t = (|EPSi,t - EPSi,t-1|)/Pi,t-1: Absolute value of
the earnings per share for the current fiscal year less the earnings per share for the prior fiscal year, deflated by the share price
at the end of the prior fiscal year. ∆AGE1i,q,t = Average age of analysts’ forecasts measured at POST1 less the average age of
analysts’ forecasts measured at PRE. ∆AGE2i,q,t = Average age of analysts’ forecasts measured at POST2 less the average age
of analysts’ forecasts measured at PRE. ERRORPRE,i,q,t = Error in the mean forecast measured at PRE, deflated by the share
price at PRE. DISPPRE,i,q,t = Forecast dispersion measured at PRE, deflated by the share price at PRE. NOi,q,t = Number
of analysts following with forecasts no older than 90 days at PRE, POST1 and POST2. Market data are from Datastream.
Control variables shown are based on the ∆ERROR1-sample except for ∆AGE2 and DISPPRE. For the dependent variables
mean (median) differences from zero are tested by applying one sample mean t-tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests): * p < 0.1,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Empirical Proxies for Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry before and after
Conference Calls
Uncertainty (V) Information Asymmetry (1-ρ)
Horizon Sign Test Wilcoxon Sign Test Wilcoxon
CC Date Date N Median p-value p-value Median p-value p-value
CC*EA-Q4t-1 PRE 282 0.2812828 0.1173847
POST1 282 0.2531633 <0.0001*** <0.0001*** 0.1376249 0.0194** 0.0271**
CC*EA-Q1t PRE 245 0.2752158 0.1875925
POST1 245 0.2336455 <0.0001*** <0.0001*** 0.1933602 0.0652* 0.0500**
CC*EA-Q2t PRE 235 0.2252174 0.1561987
POST1 235 0.1863708 <0.0001*** <0.0001*** 0.1864827 0.0006*** <0.0001***
CC*EA-Q3t PRE 214 0.1483958 0.2815853
POST1 214 0.1207090 <0.0001*** <0.0001*** 0.3580590 0.0002*** <0.0001***
Notes: This table presents empirical proxies developed by BKLS for analysts’ overall uncertainty and information
asymmetry among analysts both before and after conference calls. We also test for the sign of change in V and and (1-
ρ) between the PRE and POST1 horizon. CC*EA-Q4(1-3)t-1(t) = Earnings announcement in conference call quarters.
PRE = Horizon date 4 days before CC*EA-Q4(1-3)t-1(t). POST1 = Horizon date 20 days after CC*EA-Q4(1-3)t-1(t).
V = Overall uncertainty (see equation 7); (1-ρ) = Information asymmetry (see equation 8). Median differences from
zero are tested by applying sign tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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